

Speech by

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President Eibling, distinguished members of these two great service organizations, I feel very honored at being here today and having this opportunity to talk to you and I marvel at your patience and tolerance in coming in here on a day like this to attend this meeting.

The introduction stressed the fact that I have been in intelligence for a long time and that I spoke eight languages. I must tell you two stories about those. When I came into the Army as a private 34 years ago, I was interviewed by a sergeant and he was very impressed with the number of these languages and he went to get a major who came to see me, and he was equally impressed. Well, this was 1941 and everybody was getting sworn into the Army in high positions. Mr. Knudsen, the Chairman of General Motors, was made a Lieutenant General in Transportation, and Robert Sarnoff, of RCA, was made a Brigadier General, and I thought they were going to offer me a Lieutenant Colonelcy in military intelligence. But if they made it a Majority, I would take it since we would probably soon be in the war and everybody had to make sacrifices. So, after this was all over, everybody got down and was comparing MOS's and I said, what are MOS's; they said MOS is your Military Occupational Speciality -- that's what you're going to do in the Army. So I looked at my card

and it said "506" and I thought this was the time to use some of this leadership I was going to be called on for so soon so I turned to one of the other guys and said "Go find out what 506 is." It worked like a charm. He went down, came back with a puzzled look on his face, and he said, "506 is a truck driver." I said, "Somebody's made a mistake." Nobody had. Well, a couple of years later after I went to Officers Candidate School, they caught up with me and they plucked me out of a new Infantry Division and sent me off to North Africa.

On the language problem -- the languages are an advantage and a disadvantage. One day I was standing watching a parade in Brazil next to the Soviet Ambassador and he turned to me -- he had been in the States for six years and he spoke real good English -- and he said, "The trouble with you Americans is you never bother to learn anybody else's language." So I knew he hadn't read my biography. So I said to him, "Mr. Ambassador, that's not really true any more; it may have been true a couple of years ago, but now we really make an effort." And he said, "No, and besides, as people, you do not have gift for languages like the

Slavs." So I said to him in Russian, "Mr. Ambassador, that's a bunch of garbage." Only the Russian word I used isn't exactly "garbage." "And I am a little bit surprised that an intelligent man like you who has lived outside the Soviet Union continues to believe this kind of fairy tale." Well, that shook him a little bit, and I stepped in for the kill and that's when disaster struck. I said to him in Russian, "Mr. Ambassador, would you like to try Portuguese," knowing that I spoke it much better than he did. And he looked at me and he said, "Walters, you may be a good soldier, but diplomat you are not."

So these things sometimes get you into trouble. But, really what I am trying to talk about a little bit is the world in which we live today. This world has new dimensions. For 25 years the United States had an overwhelming strategic predominance that kept the world -- the Western world -- the NATO world -- secure and free. That predominance is no longer present. We declined

from predominance to parity and now we are in a stage of somewhat unstable equilibrium with the Soviet Union. In November 1974 at Vladivostok, President Ford and Party General Secretary Brezhnev signed an agreement--they didn't sign an agreement, they reached an agreement--limiting the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles which each nation would have to 2400, of which 1320 could have multiple re-entry vehicles. We are pursuing negotiations with the Soviets for further steps in this direction. But in large measure the success or failure of these on-going negotiations will be determined by their perception of us. Their perception of what our intentions are and of what we intend to do. The Russians respect strong people. This runs throughout their history. They will watch us to see whether we are a people determined to remain strong and free. And in large measure that will guide the kind of negotiations we have with them.

Now I would just like to say a word about the general world military situation, not in any great detail, but just to give you an idea. The United States, as of now, has 2,100,000 men under arms and we have approximately 1,900,000 men in our active reserve. The Soviet Union has a figure nearly twice that. It has 2.7 million men under arms and it has something like 6 million men in its reserves. The Peoples Republic of China has 3 million men under arms and 8 million men in its reserves. So these are some of the standings in the military affairs of the big countries. Now I would repeat that the strength of a nation is not the aggregate of its men, tanks, planes and ships; it is the resolution

of that people also that contributes and makes that nation's strength. It is the determination of that nation to remain free that makes that nation's strength. It is the determination of that nation to preserve their way of life, their own right to decide what changes they will have that makes that nation strong and perceived as strong.

The Soviet Union is very strong. The Soviet Union--to give you some idea of relations--has a 166 divisions, as compared to thirteen and one-half for the United States. We are moving on, we are going to have 16 by cutting down headquarters and support staffs, but this is still a small number. The Soviet Union has two and a half times as many tanks as the United States, it has twice as much artillery as the United States, and it is difficult to compare the military effort of the two countries. In the United States, our's is in the budget, and it's clear and we know what it is. In a wholly state-controlled economy like the Soviet Union, it is difficult to establish comparisons. The amount of money won't tell you, because salaries will buy different things in the two nations. In the United States if the U. S. Government buys some weapon in Cleveland and ships it to New York, that money is paid to some railroad company; in the Soviet Union it goes to the Soviet railroads, so that it's just moving from one Government pocket to another. Even within the Intelligence Community there is some difference as to what the exact measure of the Soviet effort is. I think, however, there is consensus that it is considerably larger than ours. And it is coming out of a gross national product

less than half as large as ours. So it represents a very substantial amount of money. China, also, has a considerable military effort but China's great strength lies in its vast land army. It is moving, as the Soviet Union is, in the area of strategic missiles. I might add that the Soviet Union at this time is testing and actually deploying four different types of intercontinental ballistic missiles. China is developing a series of intercontinental missiles, but they are still some distance behind. In fact, the other day Secretary Schlesinger noted that there has been a sort of slow down in the Chinese move in the field of strategic weapons. We don't quite know what it is or why it is, but they are not moving ahead quite as fast as we had expected them or quite as fast as one might have expected in a follow-on of what they have been doing. Now in the United States Armed Forces, our mission is the deterrence of war; it is the maintenance of stability, it is the maintenance of peace. The President and the Congress have decided that we would do this with an all-volunteer armed forces. Many of doubted that this could happen, but I think we can take pride in the results that have been achieved within our society in this respect.

In Europe, which after all is an area of extraordinary importance to us--perhaps second only to the United States itself--we stand with our NATO allies who have a common objective with us, who share many of the ideals that we have, and there are in the NATO forces deployed in Europe considerable asymmetries or differences in the way they are organized. The Soviets as I

said before, have many more tanks than we do; we have many more anti-tank weapons than they do; they have more aircraft than we do, but our aircraft are of higher performance and we think our crews are better trained for night flying, for bad weather flying, and also the actual performance of the aircraft is better. In number of men, the forces are about equally matched. We have, I think, a million 700 thousand men on the NATO side and the Warsaw Pact has about 1,680,000, although these can be reinforced from within the Soviet Union.

As I once said to one of my Soviet colleagues on this question of dis-engagement, you want us to withdraw behind the Atlantic and you will withdraw behind the Vistula, but crossing the Vistula is easier than crossing the Atlantic. And he laughed--he had never thought of it in exactly those terms.

In the past, we have counted greatly on the quality of the NATO forces and the U.S. forces, but the Soviets have made a great effort in the field of quality. All the jokes about how incompetent, how ignorant the Soviets are no longer match. They have made a great effort on improving the quality of their forces and they have been remarkably successful in so doing.

As I mentioned, in tanks, the US and the Peoples Republic of China have each approximately a quarter as many tanks as the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has seven airborne divisions; the United States has one, ready to go. In artillery they outnumber us two to one. We do have other advantages, such as the tactical nuclear weapons, and these have an additional



advantage in that as perceived by the Soviets, they do not present any threat to the existence of the Soviet Union. They could constitute a threat to Soviet aggression, but not to the existence of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union and its allies have the advantage of the initiative. In democracies you cannot start it. The NATO forces, on the other hand, have the advantage and the flexibility of being able to decide at what level they will respond to any act of aggression.

Now if I may say a word about naval forces. The Soviet Union has made a great effort, both in quantity and in quality, in improving its naval forces and they have succeeded remarkably. They have developed an ocean-going navy. After all, they reach back to the will of Peter the Great who told them they must seek out the warm waters . . . the "Goriachii vodi" . . . which has been one of the goals of their efforts, and they have done remarkably well. They have navies that sail all the seas of the world with great competence. They are building two aircraft carriers right now which are the first aircraft carriers they have ever had. They are building a large number of other good and sophisticated ships.

The United States is a maritime nation. All our alliances are in an interoceanic community. We must keep the maritime lines of communications open to our allies. We must have the ability to have a U.S. presence where it is creditably required. In China, we are beginning to see the first destroyers of native Chinese design -- not copies of Russian destroyers, but their own destroyers. More of them are being built. The Chinese have

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just built two very large, very modern shipyards--as modern as any in the world. They have a large number of guided missile boats, and they, too, are making a great effort in this area. In the field of the air forces, the Soviet Union has made a great effort, in both quality and in quantity and China is developing a new interceptor, but there again we have noticed a little bit of this flagging of the defense effort of China in some of these fields.

As we look around the world we see Europe, which, as I said before, is second only in importance to the United States because in Europe is this immense industrial capacity--this immense pool of skilled labor. And this large number of people, who, while their interests do not coincide exactly with ours, share the same kinds of ideals, the same kinds of belief, and the same kinds of feeling about the way changes should come about.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs has said, and I think I agree with him, that the best place to defend the United States is as far forward as possible, and NATO has the forces and the equipment to defend Europe successfully. NATO has served and will continue to serve the strategic interests of the United States. In the 25 years of NATO's existence, not a single square inch of soil in the area covered by the treaty, not a single citizen of any country covered by the treaty, has been lost to aggression and, in fact, there has been no aggression in the area covered by the treaty.

We do have within NATO now, various kinds of problems: economic problems; problems of the priority of resources; but, if we look, and we hear so often how NATO has been overtaken

by events that it is no longer effective, that it is no longer adapted to this time, \_\_\_\_\_ to me one of the interesting things is that the dissolution of NATO remains one of the prime objectives of Soviet foreign policy. If it were not effective and it did not have meaning for them, why would they be so insistent on this.

So, I think that in NATO we have an instrument, which, with all its shortcomings and, after all, I know of no case in history where an alliance has lasted as long as NATO alliance. It has now lasted 26 years, and I think there are few if any historical parallels to the endurance of an alliance of that type that long.

We look around us in Latin America which is an area important to the United States for geographic as well as sentimental reasons. We have some areas of concern. There is some threat from Cuba; there are Soviet aircraft and ships moving in and out of Cuba; there is Soviet naval and air activity in the Caribbean. There are many changes--South America is a continent of much change. There is a new government in Chile; there is terrorism in Argentina; there are large Soviet arms purchases by Peru; there is a surge of nationalism in Venezuela. These are areas which are of some concern to us. These are areas that tomorrow will be extremely important, and there is in Brazil--you heard some reference to my being with the Brazilians-- a giant, a superpower on the way up.

I first went to Brazil in 1943 and all they made were toothpicks and elevators for the tall buildings. Last year

they built 800,000 automobiles--they didn't assemble them, they built them. They have great shipyards building 250,000-ton tankers. For six straight years the gross national product of Brazil has increased by ten percent. This is a nation larger than the United States by another Texas. It is a nation of 110 million people. In Brazil every year there is born a Bolivia, in Brazil every three years there is born a Chile, in Brazil every seven years there is born an Argentina. I left Brazil in 1967. In that time there have been 22 million more Brazilians added to the total number of people. This may sound like a population explosion to you, but I once drove a truck from Rio de Janeiro to the Peruvian border and it took me 29 days and on the last half I was driving through an area where there was half an inhabitant per square mile. So the population explosion is not immediate for them. But nevertheless this is an area which is of vital importance to us. It is an area that controls all kinds of important resources; it is an area with which it is vital for us to maintain close relationships.

I am happy to say, though some people will see an evil intent in it, that there are excellent relationships between the military of Latin America and ours. They sometimes have a different view of their place in national life than we do, but at least in them we do not find a systematic hospitality to the United States.

In Canada and in Mexico--these are two great nations which more and more feel the need to affirm their national identity and sometimes we have squabbles of various sorts, but with these two great countries.

we have a common sense of destiny that I think will override any economic competition or differences or perceived awkwardnesses between us.

Then as we look around the world, we see Asia. America is a Pacific power--this is sometimes forgotten. I was in France when they showed a documentary on television and one of the things that surprised people the most was a statement in that film describing the Normandy landings, and then they said, that unknown to most Europeans, three days later the United States staged a landing of approximately the same size on Saipan in the Pacific. Many people in Europe and sometimes in the eastern part of the United States tend to forget that we are also a Pacific power. And this is an enormously important arena in which there are four great powers present: the Soviet Union, the Peoples Republic of China, that economic giant, Japan, and the United States. And after all, two-thirds of mankind live in that area. It is not an area that we can lightly disregard because it is important. It is an area in which, despite our efforts, peace is not yet present. We seek to promote stability and peace in a large area and a credible U. S. commitment is essential if we are to do this.

One of the interesting things that we see is the Chinese, who perceive the Soviets as their greatest threat, quietly telling our NATO partners, Japan and South Korea: don't push the Americans out yet. They do not want to see a vacuum into which the Soviets might well move. And while the Chinese's

greatest problem seems to be with the Russians, they do say we are imperialists, too. But apparently they regard us as a slightly less dangerous brand of imperialists than the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union's forces in this area are oriented towards the Peoples Republic of China. The Chinese won't talk to you very long before they remind you that there are a million Soviets camped along their borders.

I remember when I came to Paris in 1967, the French told me I should call on my Soviet colleague because he was the senior military attache there, so I called him up and said, "I am the new American military attache and I would like to call on you." He said, "Fine, come Tuesday morning." I said, "I'll come in civilian clothes." He said, "I will be in uniform." I said, "So will I." So I went there and we talked about a lot of platitudes, about the ballet, and General de Gaulle's scraping and cleaning the buildings in Paris, and various other things. And finally at the end, he said to me--without looking at me--"What do you think of the situation in Vietnam?" "Well," I said, "you know my Government's view; you want my personal view?" He said, "Yes." I said, "I think we are rendering you extraordinary services for which you are showing the most unbelievable ingratitude." He said, "What do you mean, what do you mean?" "Well," I said, "while we're in Vietnam, the Chinese are worried about their southern border, when they are no longer worried about their southern border, they are going to worry about their northern border." I said,

"We have difficulties with the Chinese, but we haven't taken 3 million square kilometers from them; and, thank God, we don't have 6,000 kilometers of common border with them. And, General, for nothing in the world would I want to be in your shoes. Do svidanya." And I walked out and left him with that one.

Two years later I met him, and he shook his head, and he said, "You know those Chinese are crazy, they think war is a good thing." I said, "General, remember what I told you the first time we met?" He said, "Yes, I do remember." So, they have a problem; obviously a war between them would be a catastrophe for mankind. The idea that we would want that or would look at that with favor is nonsense; it wouldn't, it would be a great danger for all mankind and I think a danger of a war there is receding.

The Chinese have large forces; but they do have a limited ability to project their force outside the Peoples Republic of China. They have a small navy, it is largely defensive in nature. They have a considerable number of aircraft -- a couple of hundred medium bombers and a smaller number of heavy bombers but they're copied from Soviet types or they are Soviet types and they are quite old.

I personally, and I don't speak for anybody else but myself here, have a feeling that the Chinese now feel they have enough strength in short-range missiles, in medium-range missiles, in conventional forces, to be intolerable to the Russians if the Russians do anything bad to them. And that has created, I think,

a certain stability in that area.

We do have other threats in that area. We have the continuing pressure by North Vietnam against South Vietnam. This is a controversial subject as you know. I have only one statement to make about it. There are plenty of North Vietnamese killing people in South Vietnam. There are no South Vietnamese killing anybody in North Vietnam.

Cambodia is a tough situation also. We have awkward situations in Burma, Thailand--we have some insurgencies-- the Philippines, with which we have a long historic connection, is not in a total state of quiescence. We have the recent Indian nuclear explosion and all the competition that could engender. In that area we have another giant--Indonesia-- with 120 or 130 million people, which is the largest Moslem power in the world, with enormous resources, extraordinarily strategically located. And which is still seeking what road it will take to provide its people with a better life. We hope for a secure Republic of Vietnam as we feel it would be a contribution to stability in that area.

The Middle East is the area of greatest potential for political conflict. Great importance. It is not just a bridge of the three great continents, but it is source of oil. It is the source of oil in some measure for us. But it is the source of 75% of Western Europe's oil. It is the source of 85% of Japan's oil. So, it is important to our major allies. And to some extent it is also important to us. We also



have our commitment to Israel. But we do seem to be improving our relations with the Arabs, despite the controversy on the oil and so forth. I think many of the Arabs realize they have no interest in creating chaos in the economy of the West. It would not be to their advantage.

In Africa there is no immediate threat of any military aggression of any sort, but the Soviets are installing themselves in Somalia: they have established a naval base there, they have aircraft there, and they also have people in South Yemen, across the Straits of Bab el-Mandeb.

In Tanzania you have a very large Chinese peoples' effort and you have the passage of time and the weakening of the African links to the West of these countries that were originally colonies of the West, which no longer are. You have the rise of some of the countries like Nigeria. Nigeria is geographically a relatively small country, but almost half the population of Africa is in that country. Nigeria is a large oil-producing country. And I must say--and I again I speak for myself here--they had a bitter three-year civil war at the end of which I think the Nigerian government and General Gowon, its president, showed extraordinary restraint and generosity in dealing with the side that lost the civil war and in attempting to bind up the wounds and I think Nigeria, and to some extent Zaire which is also a very rich and strategically located country, are countries on the march upward that will have an ever more important role to play in the world. But to give you some idea what is

going on in that area, the Soviet Union is rendering military assistance to 15 African countries; the Peoples Republic of China is rendering military assistance to 11 African countries. In the Indian Ocean we attempt to avoid a major confrontation with the Soviet Union, but we do wish to maintain transit rights through this Ocean and our presence there is less than the Soviet presence. The British and French also maintain forces in the Indian Ocean and we welcome them, because, as I said, our presence there is less than the Soviets.

Along with our resolution we must have the mobility. In the United States mobility means that we have to have aircraft and sealift. In our airlift we have our C-5's which have the capability to be refueled in flight; but 75% of the U. S. airlift capability is in C-141's which as of now does not have the capability of being refueled in flight. We must maintain a sealift across both the oceans; we must maintain the ability to project our power if it is required of us.

One of our difficulties at the present time is that there is no really clearly perceived threat by the American people. A whole generation of Americans is growing up who have never known the dangers and the threats that some of the older ones of us have known. The Soviet Union is embarked on a policy of detente. We welcome this and we look forward to pursuing this insofar as it can. But we do this with some prudence.

I must tell you a story that someone told me recently about detente, which doesn't necessarily reflect my opinions, but nevertheless is quite a good story. It's about a young American couple that goes to Moscow and they go to visit the zoo and they are being taken through the zoo by a young Russian and he finally takes them to this cage and in this cage is a great big Russian bear with teeth that long and claws that long. And in the same cage is a lamb--a small white lamb, looking fairly uncomfortable. And this seemed to them an odd couple to put into the same cage. So they turned to the young Russian and they said, "Why do you do that?" He said, "Why do we do that? To prove that peaceful co-existence is possible." The young American said, "Well, it is pretty impressive and it is pretty convincing." And his wife said, "It sure is." And the young Russian looked around and seeing no one, he bent towards them and said, "But, of course, you understand. Every morning we have to put in a new lamb."

~~(Much laughter):~~

So these things require a certain amount of caution before you go forward.

Now it would be difficult for me to just stop here without talking about intelligence. It is somewhat in the news in these days, and, as you know, we are appearing before various Committees to explain various things that we have done or not done and so forth and so on, at the end of which it is clear that we are going to be reorganized in some form. And reorganization

is an old, old custom. I would like to read to you what was said about it by Petronius Arbiter in 210 B.C. "We trained hard, but it seemed that every time we were to form up into teams we would be reorganized. I was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any new situation by reorganizing. And a wonderful method it is for creating the illusion of progress while producing inefficiency and demoralization." So the world has not changed too much from then until now.

One of the problems we have is that really we see a very old theory being applied in the world today. In 500 B.C. a Chinese writer by name of Sun Tzu, drawing on earlier sources from an earlier military book called I-Chen, wrote a treatise called The Art of War. Now The Art of War has been published in English although the first four editions of it were in Russian. I describe reading it as something like swimming in a pool full of molasses. It's in the form of a dialogue and if you're not Chinese it's pretty hard to do. But anyway, he distills up his advice in 13 maxims and he starts out with this one: "Fighting is the crudest form of making war," And then he starts out with the maxims-- don't worry, I'm not going to give you all thirteen. Number one: "Cover with ridicule everything that is valid in your opponent's country." Number two: "Denounce their leaders and at the right time turn them over to the scorn of their fellow countrymen." Three: "Aggravate by all means at your command all existing divergences and differences in your opponent's country." Number four: "Agitate the young

against the old." And I could go on with the rest of them. Some of them are out of date and everything else, but they do show that human nature hasn't changed all that much in that time.

Now people have tended in the past to think of intelligence as something you use to make war or to threaten war. And I think one of the interesting things that has happened is that it is also a weapon for peace. For years we and the Soviets discussed various of forms of limitation--of arms--strategic arms. But we ran up against the problem that they refused to allow any on-site inspections since they regarded this as a violation of their sovereignty. And the question became: how can any American president make an agreement unless he has the means, in light of his responsibility to the American people, to know that there is no cheating going on. It was only as we developed in intelligence the means of checking, of monitoring, of counting, that the President of the United States was able to make this kind of an agreement. It is only because we have the power to monitor any future agreements that we are able to look forward to perhaps reaching other agreements in other areas. The Soviets themselves have recognized this fact in the SALT Agreement where they say neither side will interfere with the national technical means of verification. They didn't want to say specifically what they were because they have them too; but they did want to commit themselves that they would not do this. So in this case it has opened the possibility for us to reach certain agreements in the past and it opens the possibility of reaching further

agreements and diminishing the burden of these extraordinarily high costs of strategic weapons systems for tomorrow. In 1962 we had a great discussion in the United States and a great national difference as to whether or not there was a missile gap between the Soviet Union and the United States. That is no longer possible. We know what the size of the missiles are on both sides. We know what we can check and what we cannot check.

The United States is a giant. It produces twice the gross national product of the next largest nation in the world, but a blind giant is a pretty helpless guy if he cannot see what is coming. If he cannot look ahead, as we have the responsibility to look ahead, not at the childish things but at the important things. Who will be in control of the Soviet Union five years from today? What will their dispositions be towards us and the rest of the world? Who will be in control of the Peoples Republic of China five or ten years from now? What will be their disposition towards the rest of the world? What is going on in Soviet or Chinese research and development that will be important, that will have an impact on us and what we must do in the years ahead? These are the really big problems that we have to face and answer. These are the problems on which we have to report to our masters, to the Executive Branch, to the President and to the Congress. We report to the Congress on an average of once every two weeks a full briefing, nothing hidden, to our oversight committees. We tell them anything they want. Each year the appropriate committees know what our budget is; they know what

our program is and they vote the money for it. We report also to the President's Foreign Intelligence Board--a distinguished board of private citizens from both parties, who have no ties with the Intelligence Community. We report to our oversight committees. The idea that we have a foreign policy of our own is nonsense. We don't. We do what we are told. We work--we make suggestions to our masters--but we must work within the framework of U. S. policy. We know that we have to work within the kind of intelligence system, the kind of reporting and the kind of control that the American people want and demand. But we do not feel that we have to do everything, as the saying goes, in Macy's window. You don't get very far. You lose the confidence of some of your allies. And as we have been cut in personnel--and we have been cut very remarkably in personnel--we need the help of our allies' intelligence services. Some people don't think they are good; well, I have some news for you, some of them are very good. I'll just tell you a story that happened to me.

Many years ago I went to Italy as Military Attache and I got briefed in Washington; they said, "Well, the Italians have pretty good intelligence system, but they don't have much money, you know, but they do pretty well." So I arrived in Italy and I made arrangements for my first visit to an Italian unit which was the Third Corps in Milan. And the Pentagon was in one of its phases of economy, so I couldn't take my driver, so I drove myself. But when I got to Milan the Italians would give me a car and drive it. So I drove up to Leghorn, which is an

American base on the west coast of Italy, and I spent the night there so I knew there were no cards going in as they go in from every hotel in Europe to the police at 10:00 every night. And the next day, instead of going straight to Milan, I remembered a terrific restaurant in Florence where they had the best green lasagna I have ever eaten. So I thought, "I'll get to Milan a couple of hours later but it doesn't make any difference because I don't do anything until tomorrow with the Italians. So I drove to Florence, parked in front of the station, went in and the green lasagna was just as good as ever. And while I was eating, a man came up to me and clicked his heels and said, "Senor Colonelo, there have been several changes in your program in Milan and the Chief of Service wanted you to get them before you got there." Now since Florence is a city of 720,000 people and I had not been conscious of anybody following me, I concluded I was getting a demonstration from the Italian service that they knew where I was and what I was doing. And, indeed they did. Fourteen years later in my present capacity I went back to Rome and I finished my business with the Italians on Friday night and I was due in Paris on Monday morning. So I decided I was going to go up and see my old World War II battlefields near Florence, so I drove up to Florence with my assistant and checked in to the hotel and went for a walk. It was about 1:00 o'clock and I was in the square in front of the station and I said, "Gee, Otello's; I wonder if the green lasagna is still as good." So I went over there and it was still



as good. And when we finished eating I called the waiter and I said, "May I have the bill?" I was in civilian clothes, and he said, "Senor Generale, there is no bill." I said, "What do you mean there's no bill? Four of us have just had lunch!" At that a young man at a neighboring table stood up and he said, "Senor Generale, in order that you may know that in 12 years the Service has not lost its skill, once again you are the guest of the Service."

Well, I told this to my French colleague and I could see that his nose was a little bit out of joint at this. You know, at this rather remarkable performance by his Italian colleagues. But at the same time I told him of an unfortunate incident that had occurred to me. On one of my trips to Paris I had bought a book, a geography published in Paris in 1754. And it really was good because it described all the countries in the world from the French point of view and all the known geography of the world. It had some interesting comments on the various countries. For instance, it said "The Germans are very musical and very intelligent, but they are somewhat warlike. The Russians are frustrated. Their Prince will not let them travel; they are great soldiers and take out their frustrations in liquor. The British have such a high opinion of themselves that they have no room for a high opinion of anybody else." Well, I left this book on the airplane coming back to the United States and I was really put out because I collect old books and this was a really good one. So I mentioned this to my French colleague and he

said, "What was the name of this book?" I said, Gee, I can't remember." He said, "Who wrote it?" I said, "Gee, I can't remember." He said, "Well, what do you know about it?" Well, I said, "I remember there was a printed dedication on the flyleaf to Mademoiselle de Croizat." "Well," he said, "you know, trying to find the name of a 250-year-old book that you don't know the name of and you don't know the author of is not the easiest thing in the world."

Not long ago he paid me a visit. Guess what he put on my desk? He found one; I don't know where he found it, but he found a copy. So we do need the help of friendly foreign services and if friendly foreign services get the feeling that we are exposing their secrets or their help, we will get no more of it. And the United States, at least in that respect, will be a blind giant.

Now I want to say one more word. I am not an old CIA man; I have not spent my whole life there, I came there a little under three years ago and if people ask me what my feelings are after three years, I can sum them up in one word: reassurance. I am reassured at the caliber of the people there, I am reassured at the competence, I am reassured at the continuity that I find there.

To give you one idea that things aren't quite as black as you might wonder. Every two weeks we normally get about 700 applications from young people to work there. In the last two weeks of January and the first two weeks of February, we got 1750 applications. Some of this is the economy unquestionably,

some of this is also what the Hollywood actress said, "I don't care what they say about me as long as they spell my name right." But there is, in this country, an understanding of the fact that the United States cannot stumble forward into the future completely blind. Whether we like it or not, there is a silent battlefield--a silent battlefield of intelligence. We are conscious of what is going on. People don't notice it because it isn't noisy. Every morning when I walk into my office, I look up on the wall and I see the gold stars that commemorate those members of the organization of which I have the honor to be Deputy Director who have fallen unsung, unheralded in the service of their country; and across from them is the motto of that organization which says: "Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free."

I think that in the world we live in that that should be changed slightly: You must know the truth and the truth will keep you free. There is an old biblical quotation from the Prophet Isaiah, which I think is applicable to this silent battlefield, where if America is to live and to go on being what it is to us, "the home of the brave and the free" as we said earlier, especially the free. That quotation says: "Whom shall I send; who will go for us?" Since World War II, the men of your Intelligence Community: Defense Intelligence, Army Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, Naval Intelligence, and Central Intelligence, have said, steadfastly and unerringly, "Here I am, send me."